Introduction
Several years ago, the Commission on Auditors' Responsibility recommended the elimination of "subject-to" (uncertainty) audit qualifications in audit reports. The Commission believed that full disclosures of uncertainties by management were sufficient and the subject-to qualifications were merely redundant and confusing [1978, pp. 25-28] .^ Several * Professor, University of Florida; tAssociate Professor, University of Alberta; **Associate Professor, University of Alberta. We thank an anonymous reviewer, Linda Bamber, and Ira Solomon for their comments. In addition, we gratefully acknowle%e the comments of participants at workshops at Concordia University, Baruch College, University of Illinois in Chicago, University at Alberta, Ohio State University, and Pennsylvania State University, and the research assistance of Charlie Chi and Jim Craig. [Accepted for publication November 1985.] ' The Report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibility refers (AICPA [1978, p. 27] ) to several cases indicating a conflict between the auditor's role in expressing opinion on the fairness of presentation and reporting of uncertainty. That is, the auditor is playing the roles of the reporter and interpreter of financial statements. The Commission questioned the need to single out for inclusion in the auditor's report the contingencies for which adequate disclosure is made by management. studies have since examined both opinions/attitudes on this proposal (e.g., Dillard, Murdock, and Shank [1978] , Shank, Dillard, and Murdock [1979] , and Mutchler [1984] ) and the impact of subject-to audit opinions on users' decisions (e.g., Libby [1979] and Hicks [1982] ). Of particular interest for our purposes is the study by Libby. The subjects, 36 bankers contacted by mail, were presented with a number of cases which included levels of uncertainty, disclosure, and audit qualifications. Libby's results indicated that the subject-to opinion did not have a significant influence on the bankers' assessments of risk in his cases, although reporting the uncertainty per se was found to have had a significant effect (Libby [1979, pp. 46-49] ).
Libby's results were contested by Bertholdt [1979] and Schultz [1979] who argued that the research design has "biased the study against finding any information content in the footnote or audit report" (Bertholdt [1979, p. 60] ). Both discussants questioned the validity ofthe conclusions on several grounds related to both internal and external validity considerations.
This paper reports the findings of a study that replicates and extends the Libby study. One extension was made possible by the use of Canadian rather than U.S. subjects. Since 1980, Canadian bankers have been operating in a system where subject-to opinions have been eliminated. Other extensions involved the use of various segmentations of information, different sequences of the flow of information and judgments, multiple loan applicants (borrowers), and a one-to-one inteirviewing scheme which converted the bankers' offices into individual laboratories.
Despite the differences between our experimental setting and design and that used by Libby, our findings confirm his original conclusions: that is, managements' disclosures of contingencies with subject-to qualified audit reports had no significant additional effect on bankers' assessments of the riskiness of clients. The findings not only show that Libby's conclusions were robust with respect to the choice of research design and method, but they also suggest a degree of external validity that might prove useful to policymakers.
Section 2 describes the Canadian setting. In section 3 we present the research design, followed by statements of hs^otheses in section 4. Results and discussion appear in section 5, and conclusions in section 6.
The Canadian Setting
Unlike the AICPA, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) agreed with the substance of the recommendation made by the Commission on Auditors' Responsibility. The CICA reasoned that generally accepted accounting principles include a requirement for adequate disclosure of uncertainties which renders the subject-to qualification redundant, and effective in November 1980, the CICA canceled the requirement to provide subject-to audit reports when contingencies exist (see the CICA Handbook, sec. 5510.49). In April 1981, the CICA issued an Accounting Guideline that applies when a Canadian auditor is reporting on the financial statements of a Canadian company that also submits audited financial statements to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. In such cases the Canadian auditor is required to include a clean opinion followed by supplementary paragraphs indicating both the nature of the confiict between Canadian and U.S. reporting standards, and the fact that the audit opinion would be qualified under U.S. generally accepted auditing standards.^ In this study, we refer to this type of report as a "two-sided opinion."
The nature and timing of these CICA requirements allowed us to use three reporting situations in our experimental designs: subject-to required (prior to November 1980), two-sided opinion required (joint reports after April 1981), and a clean opinion (no subject-to report required).
Research Design

DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
As experimental variables, we used the three forms of audit report (clean, subject-to, and two-sided opinions) and two common types of loss contingency (tax assessment and litigation against the company by a client). The dependent variable was the commercial bank officers' assessment of the riskiness of corporate borrowers. The subjects were asked to make repeated judgments concerning the debt-paying ability of each of three companies over a simulated period of three years. They were furnished with comparative financial statements, footnotes, audit reports, standard financial ratios, and other information for each of the three years. The task was performed in the bankers' offices, where a researcher met with each loan officer to explain the task and to provide the experimental material for one year at a time.
In this design, risk premiums can be revised in the light of prior period performance. Three indicators of risk assessment were included: (1) the premium above the prime rate (assumed to be revised every year) to be charged for loans to the experimental companies, (2) a score indicating the level of each company's debt-paying ability, and (3) an estimate of the probability of default on the loan.T he subjects were 64 Canadian commercial bank loan officers having an average of nine years experience with commercial loan applications. They were employed in seven large banks in a metropolitan area.
The three hypothetical companies used in the study (denoted ABC, LMN, and XYZ) were developed from the annual reports of three Canadian corporations. In order to reduce the effect of confounding variables, actual financial statments were modified as follows: (a) Total assets were scaled down to about $92, $86, and $100 million for ABC, LMN, and XYZ, respectively. This modification avoids introducing company size as a variable, (b) Capitalization ratios and past profit trends were made similar across companies. Also, in the second and third decision years, two constraints were imposed: (1) financial leverage-the levels of debt to equity in the second and third decision periods were either equal to or lower than the levels of that ratio in the first judgment period; and (2) profitability-the ratio of net income to sales was kept at 0.02 throughout the three judgment periods. The combined effect of these modifications was to homogenize the relative financial change over time so that discrimination among companies would be based only on the uncertainty related to the contingencies.
The complete research design is presented in table 1 and is explained below. Other than the manipulated variations in audit reports, all subjects received the same set of information (in the same sequence) for each of the three years. The loss contingency manipulation initially occurred in ' The two experiments are based on three companies and three decisions. In all cases, a company's financial position changed over time but the following constraints apply: (1) net income to sales remained the same; (2) net income to net worth improved in subsequent years over year 1; (3) long-term debt to net worth either remained the same or improved over time.
A "two-sided opinion" refers to the case where Canadian stockholders get a clean opinion that is followed by a paragraph containing a subject-to qualification for the U.S. stockholders. the second year of the experiment and consisted of a tax assessment against company ABC, and a client litigation against XYZ. No contingency was reported for LMN. In year 3, the tax assessment remained the same for ABC, but the litigation was settled for XYZ; LMN continued in a no-contingency state. The manipulation of the loss contingency can be summarized as follows: The manipulation of the audit report variable was kept consistent with the history of audit reporting of contingencies in Canada. Prior to 1980, the audit-reporting environment for a given company could include a subject-to qualification, but not after 1980, unless it pertained to firms falling under both U.S. and Canadian audit reporting standards (twosided opinion).
Subjects were divided into two groups that differed by the assumed year of changing audit report requirements in Canada. For group 1 the change year was assumed to be year 3; for group 2, it was year 2. Thus, group 1 received qualified opinions in year 2 for companies ABC and XYZ (prior to change in regulations), whereas group 2 received a clean opinion for ABC and a two-sided opinion for XYZ in year 2 (after changes in regulation) since XYZ was also required to report in the United States.
In year 3, auditors rendered clean opinions for all companies, although the loss contingency continued for ABC. The experimental manipulation of the audit report is summarized below: Each banker made judgments about the interest rate premium (IP) for each company in each of the three simulated years. The loan provision required that IP be adjustable and revised once a year after the annual report was received. Hence, each banker made three initial IP judgments and six subsequent revisions. Since the bankers might have used different individual decision models, we tried to eliminate the effects of model differences. To do this we used the initial judgments of each individual as "standards" against which other judgments by the same individual are compared. Specifically, we defined: IPkj = interest premium charged by banker i in period k; and DIPkj = difference in interest premium charged by banker j in period k compared with period i, k > i; that is, DIP21J = ÍIP2J Ĩ P^J), and DIP.y = ilPsj -/Py). We then used DIP as a measure refiecting information effects which can be considered neutral with respect to bankers' model differences.
Expectations and Hypotheses
TIME-TO-MATURITY
In addition to our manipulated variables, we also allowed the loan's time-to-maturity to operate on bankers' revisions of judgments. Each loan was unsecured, with principal and interest due in four annual installments. In the absence of other information, the decreasing timeto-maturity, along with the reduction of the debt, should lower the risk of default. Thus interest premiums should decline over time. Accordingly, we expect IP3 < IP2 < IPi (where the bar indicates average over all j bankers in the group), in which case DIP would be negative-that is, DIPsi < DIP21 < 0. In particular, this relation was expected for company LMN since LMN disclosed no contingencies. As for ABC and XYZ, the other information contained in the manipulated variables could alter the direction of DIP throughout the period and across the companies, as discussed below.
COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL COMPANIES
A direct test of the significance of the experimental treatments was accomplished by comparing DIP of ABC and XYZ against DIP of the control company, LMN. The following hypotheses provide an indication of our expectations for these companies, for both groups of subjects:
ifi
: DIP2MBC) > DIP21ÍLMN), and DIPg^iABC) > DIP^^ALMN); H2: DIP21ÍXYZ) > DIP21ÍLMN); Hz-. DIPsiiXYZ) = DIPsiiLMN).
Hi and H2 assume that unfavorable information for ABC in years 2 and 3 and for XYZ in year 2 will cause increases in interest premiums as compared to LMN. H3 assumes that the elimination of the uncertainty for XYZ in year 3 will remove any differential evaluation relative to LMN. Hi, H2, and H3 assume that information about contingent losses will have the same impact regardless of whether the source of disclosure is a management footnote or an audit report. A distinction between sources is made in the next section.
WITHIN-COMPANY COMPARISONS BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS
The unfavorable information consisted of three categories: (¿) loss contingency disclosure only {ABC: year 2, group 2; and year 3, both groups); (ii) loss contingency disclosure and qualified audit report {ABC: year 2, group 1; and XYZ: year 2, group 1); and {Hi) loss contingency disclosure accompanied by a two-sided audit opinion {XYZ: year 2, group 2). Based on this design, we formed the following hypotheses regarding the incremental information of the audit report:
For ABC: DÏP21 (group 1) > Ü/Pgi (group 2); (disclosure -1-qualification) vs. (disclosure only) For ABC: WPai (group 1) > DIPSI (group 2); (disclosure preceded by qualification) vs. (disclosure only) For XYZ: MP21 (group 1) > SZPai (group 2); (disclosure -Iqualification) vs. (disclosure H-two-sided opinion) 7: For XYZ: SZPsi (group 1) = ñíPsi (group 2); (contingency cleared) and (contingency cleared). The rationale for H4 is simply that if the audit report provides additional information regarding a possible loss to the company, the interest premium should increase. H5 assumes there will be a difference in IP caused by a prior conditioning of bankers, given that the third year's clean opinion was preceded in the second year by a subject-to qualification in one group, but by a clean opinion in the other group. He assumes bankers will perceive a difference between a qualified and a two-sided opinion. Finally, H^ implies that bankers' reactions in the third year would be unaffected by prior conditions, once the uncertainty was removed.
GROUP SIMILARITY-A NECESSARY CONDITION
A between-group design required that both groups of bankers come from the same population. We verified the similarity of groups by comparing first the initial-year judgments between groups on a companyby-company basis, and then by comparing judgments of each group on LMN over the three years. In both of these cases (initial year and company LMN), conditions were identical for both groups. Tests of significant differences between means and variances for both were generally insignificant at conventional levels (available upon request), so there is no reason to suspect that the two groups of bankers came from different populations. ' D/P21 (DIP31) is the premium in year 2 (3) minus the premium in year 1.
S.E. is the standard error of the mean. * Statistically significant at p < 0.01, one tail. '' Statistically significant at p < 0.05, one tail. " Differences between the average premium for LMN m group 1 and group 2 were not significantly different from zero at p < 0.01.
Results
Hypotheses 1-7 were tested using bivariate comparisons.* Results of these tests are presented in table 2.
RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES 1-3
As shown in table 2, DIP for LMN was significantly negative throughout (p < .01, one tail), which suggests that the required interest premium was reduced from period 1 to period 2 to period 3 as the loan's time-tomaturity became shorter, the debt was reduced, and the company continued to be free from reporting an unusual uncertainty. In contrast, table 2 shows that the change in the required interest premium for ABC was significantly greater (at p < 0.01, one tail) than the premium for LMN in both the second and third years of the loan. This significant difference held for both groups, indicating that bankers viewed both the contingency and contingency/qualified opinion as unfavorable information.
As shown in table 2, the change in the required interest premium for XYZ in year 2 was significantly greater (p < 0.01, one tail) than DIP for •• A reviewer raised a question concerning the propriety of using parametric analysis for IP and DIP. Since measures of DIP are ratio scale, only homogeneity of variances becomes a relevant issue. The F-tests on variances indicated that the homogeneity of variance assumption was satisfied. In addition, nonparametric tests were also conducted for all the comparisons reported in this paper, with quite similar results.
LMN in both groups. Bankers viewed the combinations of contingency/ quahfied opinion and contingency/two-sided opinion as unfavorable information.
The contingency of XYZ was cleared in year 3, and the relative risk position of the company improved significantly (p < .01, one-tail test). We expected that it would not differ significantly from that of LMN. Table 2 shows that the change in the required interest premium from year 1 to year 3 was not significantly different (at conventional levels) between LMN and XYZ.
RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES 4-7
The most critical question examined by this experiment was whether there was information content in the subject-to opinion. Hi states that the change in interest premium from year 1 to year 2 for ABC group 1 (contingency -I-qualification) should be greater than for ABC group 2 (contingency only), if there is information content in the qualification. A comparison of average D/P21 between the two groups indicates that the null hypothesis of no difference is not rejected at the 0.05 level (onetail test).
As shown in table 2, the average interest premium for ABC with a qualified opinion increased (i.e., there was an increase in perceived risk), while for ABC with no qualification the interest premium decreased slightly. Thus, bankers reacted to the reporting differences by assigning a slightly higher premium for the joint presentation of qualified audit report and loss contingency disclosure. However, the difference between the changes in interest premiums for the two groups is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
The contingent loss disclosure continued for ABC for both groups in year 3, but no subject-to opinion was required for either. However, group 1 received a qualified report in year 2, whereas group 2 received a clean report in the same year. As shown in table 2, the changes in interest premiums were not significantly different between the two groups (p > 0.15), indicating that bankers evaluated the risk to be the same in year 3 for both groups regardless of previous reporting differences. Again, this result is consistent with the notion that there is little information content in the opinion.
Average changes in interest premium were not significantly different between the two groups for XYZ in the second year. Although the form of reporting contingent loss in that year differed between group 1 (subject-to qualification) and group 2 (a two-sided opinion), there was not a correspondingly different effect on bankers' assessment of risk.
When the contingency was cleared for XYZ in year 3, the average change in required interest premium dropped to the point of not being significantly different from the premium change for LMN, which is consistent with a reduction in uncertainty. While the decline in interest premium was slightly larger for group 2 (where year 3 was preceded by a two-sided opinion) than for group 1 (where the case was preceded by a subject-to qualification), these differences were not significantly different (p > 0.30).
Taken together, the results of testing hypotheses Hi, Hi, and JÎB can be interpreted as follows: (a) bankers perceived information content in managements' disclosures of uncertainties; (b) the addition of qualified opinions did not significantly affect their risk assessment decisions; and (c) removal of a qualified opinion had no significant impact on bankers' decisions. The results from testing hypotheses H2, H^, He, and HT, taken together, confirm (a), (b) , and (c) above, and also suggest that a twosided audit opinion was not viewed as being significantly different from a subject-to opinion.
Conclusions and Limitations
This paper reports results from an experiment which replicated and extended Libby's [1979] study of the information content of the subjectto opinion using an experimental design which overcame some initial criticism of his study. Differences from Libby's study consist of using an experimental design that included multiple periods and treatments and using a group of subjects (Canadian bankers) who have had experience working (since November 1980) without subject-to requirements. Notwithstanding these differences in overall experimental design, our results confirm the findings Libby reported in 1979. The findings of both studies consistently indicate that disclosure of uncertainties due to contingencies is considered relevant information by bankers. However, the addition of a qualified opinion in the audit report (including the so-called two-sided audit opinion in Canada) has no significant impact on bankers' decisions, given the disclosure of the uncertainties alone.
One possible limitation of both studies is the use of litigation contingencies. Even though we used two different subclasses-a client litigation, and a tax assessment which was not litigated-the nature of the contingencies is such that bankers (and other users) would not perceive auditors as having the special expertise needed to assess their future implications. Thus, the results of the two studies may not extend to other forms of contingency qualifications, such as asset realizations or going-concern opinions.
